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EDITORIAL
CARDOZO SUCCEEDS HOLMES
After Holmes-Cardozo. The nation's leading jurists resemble each
other in so many respects that President Hoover would have found
difficulty overlooking Benjamin N. Cardozo as successor to retired
Oliver Wendell Holmes. Qualified to the letter Cardozo at sixty-one
takes a place in the United States Supreme Court. The nation's gain
has been New York's loss.
Since 1914 Cardozo has been the dominant power of the New
York Court of Appeals. In the last five years its chief justice ex
officio. Wielding a widespread influence, .the reputation of the New
York court has advanced materially in recent years largely because of
th confidence placed in its most capable leader.
Philosopher, liberal, humanitarian, Cardozo is to Holmes as Holmes
was to Marshall. These outstanding personalities have given tremendous prestige to American administrative justice. Given less to dissent than Holmes, Cardozo is reluctant to, wander from standard rules.
His expedite measures in quashing the unnecessary delays in administration have won him the admiration of conservatives. In his decisions freedom of thought and speech is defended in beautiful English. First and foremost he is a scholar.
Underlying his opinions is what might be called a human value
formula; that law is servant of mankind and not the converse. He
does not sacrifice this "human value" for logic. He has often voiced
his attitude on third degree brutalities, pointing out evil consequences
and their effects. In compensation cases his affiliation has been with
the workman to the extent of allowing damages in cases where employees were injured going to and from work. He upheld acts forbidding night work for women in factories.
Cardozo had been on the bench but a short time when he rendered
one of his most famous decisions.' The question of responsibility of
a manufacturer of automobiles to remote purchasers had been a much
debated issue with considerable argument to support both the liability
and non-liability view. Contrary to the law as laid down in Cadillac
Motor Car Co. v. Johnson,2 Cardozo, in the MacPherson v. Buick
1 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N. E. 1050 (N. Y. 1916).
2 221 Fed. 801 (1915), rev'd in 261 Fed. 878 (1919) following the Mac-

Pherson case.
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Motor Co. case,3 answered the question in the affirmative, maintaining
that the manufacturer was .liable. In part he said: "If the nature
of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb
in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its
nature gives warning of the consequences to be expected. If to the
element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will be
used by persons other than the purchaser and used without new tests,
then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of
danger is under a duty to make it carefully. That is as far as we are
required to go for the decision of this case. There must be knowledge
of a danger not merely possible but probable." 4
In Hynes v. New York Cent. R. Co.5 he allowed the mother of a
sixteen year old boy who was killed as the result of a flying electric
wire which struck the lad as he was about to dive from a springboard,
to recover. The case goes far to exemplify his attitude in justice regardless of pressure that might be brought to produce the opposite
result. With all this he has the respect of every large corporation
lawyer in New York who many times have found him unwilling to
compromise his philosophic humanitarian views with their particular
problems.
The New York Wrongful Death statute allowed recovery only to
persons killed while driving within the state of New York. A resident
of the state of New York on business traveling through Massachusetts was struck and killed by a Standard Oil truck. 6 Cardozo upheld the Massachusetts act which allowed recovery; his persuasive
controversion playing the major role in the concurring deduction of the
other judges. This manifests vividly with what regard his foresight
and reasoning is held.
When the Soldiers Bonus Issue presented itself in New York,
Cardozo came to the defense of the War Veteran to show that the
proposed bonus was not unconstitutional and not incongrous with
a statute then in effect providing in substance that no state funds
should be loaned to individuals or corporations. Openly taking sides
with the "Dough-Boy" he said that nothing was to be inferred from
the statute which would prevent the state from rewarding its public
servants.
He has taken a constructive as well as a judicial stand on legislative matters, at times striking at fallacies of acts and at other times
suggesting legislation. For example, he showed the aforesaid inade3
4

5
6

Op. cit. supra note 1.
Op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 1053.
131 N. E. 898 (1921).
Louchs v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N. E. 198 (N. Y. 1918).
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quacy of the Dead Man's Statute and the misconstruction of the individual and corporation loans act. His proposal to make insanity
a ground for divorce was subsequently acted upon by the legislature.
In attempts to clear the slum-districts in'New York, to free them
from spread of contagion, Cardozo in promoting the Multiple Dwelling
Act ameliorated the living conditions of thousands of unfortunate
people whose life theretofore had been at best a mere existence.
Cardozo's life has been a lesson in the value of American liberality.
Like Spinoza, whose forefathers were driven from Spain, Cardozo's
ancestors were forced to leave Portugal by the Inquisition. What the
former has been to philosophy Cardozo is to law. His early legal
adventures were appeals which he argued for busy lawyers. Exhaustive in research, profound in reading, aggressive in controversy he
soon drew the respectful attention and later the unstinted praise of
those with whom he came in contact. He is the author of three remarkable books: Nature of Judicial Process (1921); The Growth of
the Law (1924); Paradoxes of Legal Science (1928). In these he
illustrates his humane philosophy. He is forever -seeking knowledge
and like other careful judicious seekers is forever finding it. His
works and decisions are fountains of diversified intelligence. From
these rich sources the stream of the Cardozo influence flows out to
enrich the whole field of American Law.
Francis Adams is said -to have uttered a sigh of satisfaction as he
reflected that he had gone through his life without making a conspicuous ass of himself. Says Cardozo: "This is my own paen of
jubilation at the end of each Judicial year." To his paen of jubilation
we enthusiastically join our own.
Edward C. Massa.

